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Problems for Russellian Act-Type Theories 
 
Arvid Båve, Lund University 
 
This paper presents two interrelated problems for Russellian act-type theories of propositions—
particularly, that of Scott Soames (2010, 2015)—and argues that Fregean act-type theories are 
either better equipped to deal with them or avoid them altogether. The first problem concerns 
“complex singular terms”, like ‘2+2’, and the second one is King’s objection from 
“proliferating propositions”.  
Act-type theories of propositions take propositions to be act types directed toward their 
constituents. The Russellian variety of this theory takes these constituents to be worldly 
particulars, properties, and relations. On Soames’ theory, the proposition that Socrates is wise 
is the act type of predicating the property of wisdom of the object Socrates.  
Fregean theories of propositions take them to be built up from concepts, rather than 
worldly entities. A simple variety of a Fregean act-type theory takes concepts to have a first-
order syntax and posits only a single propositional mode of combination, a multigrade act of 
“conjoining”, such that all complex concepts are act types of conjoining their immediate 
constituents in a certain order. Taking ‘C(c1, …, cn)’ to abbreviate ‘the act type of conjoining 
c1, …, cn in that order’, [p] to abbreviate ‘the proposition that p’, and using SMALL CAPS to refer 
to simple concepts, we can illustrate the theory through such identity claims as, 
 
[Socrates is wise] = C(WISE, SOCRATES) 
[Socrates is wise and Plato does not admire Socrates] =  
C(AND, C(WISE, SOCRATES), C(NOT, C(ADMIRE, PLATO, SOCRATES))), 
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and so on. In Båve (2017: §VI), I sketch a theory on these lines, which will be further developed 
and defended in future work. On this theory, every concept is an act type, which is individuated 
by its entertaining conditions, which are to the effect that the act type plays a certain 
psychological role. For present purposes, however, the above minimal assumptions will suffice 
for the comparisons with Russellian act-type theories I will be making.  
In addition to the advantages this type of theory has over Russellian act-type theories that 
I will highlight in this paper, there are of course several familiar reasons for preferring Fregean 
theories of propositions over Russellian ones. There is also a perhaps surprising benefit that the 
above Fregean act-type theory has over Russellian ones. A major desideratum on theories of 
meaning and propositions is to give an account of non-extensional constructions in purely 
extensional terms. That is in effect what is achieved by possible-world semantics, whose 
language is entirely extensional, although its object language typically is not. 
It seems that Russellian act-type theorists need to take the verb that describes the central 
act type on propositional constituents to be intensional. It would otherwise be difficult to 
account for propositions expressed by sentences containing empty names, like [Pegasus is a 
winged horse] (ignoring noneist views, on which one may quantify over non-existents). And 
indeed, Soames says that the verb, “predicate” is an “intensional transitive”, like ‘look for’ 
(2014: 101). The more specific act type of “indirectly predicating” that Soames defines (more 
on which anon), is also clearly non-extensional.  
Fregean act-type theorists, by contrast, are free to declare their proposition designators—
particularly, the verb ‘conjoin’—purely extensional. So if SOCRATES is the first concept I 
thought of this morning, then [Socrates is wise] = C(WISE, the first concept I thought of this 
morning). Needless to say, this does nothing to get us any closer to giving a semantics for non-
extensional constructions, but the point is merely that the Fregean theory has an extensional 
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metalanguage whereas Soames’ theory does not, and that the former therefore can whereas the 
latter cannot (as currently stated) hope to satisfy the relevant desideratum. 
Let us now consider two other accounts that have affinities with this Fregean act-type 
theory. Firstly, Wayne Davis (2003, forthcoming) defends a theory on which both propositions 
and concepts are “cognitive event types”. However, he does not adopt a Fregean act-type theory 
in the above sense. Firstly, he denies that propositions are act types (forthcoming: §10), and 
thus takes there to be significant and relevant differences between acts and events. Secondly, 
he expresses scepticism about the idea that theories of propositions must explain propositional 
“glue”, or the way in which propositional constituents are “held together” (forthcoming: §10). 
I interpret this as entailing that there is no act type on propositional constituents for which a 
substantive account can be given.  
Secondly, Peter Hanks has devised a theory (2011, 2015), which is something of a hybrid 
Fregean-Russellian view. On his view, the proposition that Socrates is wise is a complex act 
consisting of three sub-acts: (i) the act of referring to Socrates, (ii) the act of expressing the 
property of wisdom, and (iii) the act of predicating wisdom of Socrates. This view is similar to 
the Fregean variant in that it can distinguish propositions about the same object, by taking them 
to involve distinct acts of referring. His theory differs from “pure” Fregean theories, however, 
in taking the act of predicating, to be directed towards worldly entities rather than concepts. 
 Let us adopt some convenient conventions to simplify our discussion. Let us refer to 
constituents of propositions by enclosing subsentential expressions within brackets. We can 
now say that, on both Russellian and Fregean act-type theories, [Socrates is wise] is an act type 
directed toward [wise] and [Socrates]. For Russellians, [wise] is wisdom and [Socrates] is 
Socrates (the man), whereas for Fregeans, [wise] is a monadic predicative concept, and 
[Socrates] is an individual concept. We can now see immediately that Hanks’ theory is special 
in that there will be two candidates for [Socrates], namely, Socrates himself or an act of 
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referring to him (and similarly for [wise]). This convention is therefore limited in that it does 
not apply in any obvious way to his propositions, but I will mostly be comparing Soames’ 
theory with an analogous Fregean theory, and for these purposes, our notation is sufficient. 
 In order to describe propositions with canonical designators belonging to different 
theories, I will be using functors, defined in terms of whatever mode of conceptual combination 
that the theory postulates. Thus, if we define f(x, y) as the act type of predicating x of y, we can 
say that, on Soames’ theory, [Socrates is wise] = f([wise], [Socrates]), and so on (cf. Båve 
(2019b)). 
 
1. The problem of complex singular terms 
In this section, I will point to some problems with Soames’ account of complex singular terms, 
like ‘2+2’. Although Soames is a Millian, and thus holds that [Phosphorus is hot] = [Hesperus 
is hot], he does not go so far as to identify [2+2 is even] with [4 is even]. In order to distinguish 
these propositions, Soames posits several different types of act types. Let me quote the relevant 
principles in full: 
 
Direct Predication 
To directly predicate a property P of x is to have x in mind as the thing represented 
as having P.  
 
Complex singular terms require the relation mediate predication holding between an 
agent, a property, and a function-argument pair f-plus-y.  
 
Mediate Predication 
To mediately predicate P of the complex f-plus-y is to aim to (indirectly) represent 
whatever, if anything, it determines (the value of f at y) as having P.  
 





Instances of the schema A indirectly predicates P of T (where ‘P’ is replaced by a 
term standing for a property P* and ‘T’ is replaced by a complex singular term) 
express the claim that the agent mediately predicates P* of the propositional content 
of ‘T’. (2015: 36) 
 
Let us refer to such “complexes” referred to in the definition of mediate predication using our 
brackets, so that the constituent expressed by ‘2+2’ is [2+2].  
Now, “mediate predication” is very different from direct predication. This is a 
disadvantage. The sentences ‘2+2 is even’ and ‘4 is even’ are of the same form and the 
propositions expressed by them should therefore differ only in regards to the parts 
corresponding to ‘4’ and ‘2+2’. The aspect of the propositions relating to the predicate “is 
even”, or the mode of composition [F(a)] should be the same, on grounds of uniformity. But 
things get worse as we consider some further complications that burden this theory. 
 A Russellian account of propositions, it seems, must have the general structure of 
Soames’ theory, if it is to treat ‘2+2’ as a genuine singular term (rather than a Russellian 
description), and also accommodate certain further obvious facts. One such fact is that [2+2 is 
even] ≠ [4 is even]. This shows that ‘2+2’ and ‘4’, while having the same referent, must express 
different propositional constituents. In other words, [2+2] ≠ [4]. But a further fact that must be 
accommodated is that [2+2 is even] ≠ [[2+2] is even]. The latter proposition is about the 
complex [2+2] and is false, since such complexes as [2+2] are not numbers. This means that 
there cannot be a single mode of combination f such that [4 is even] = f([is even], [4]) and [2+2 
is even] = f([is even], [2+2]). As a special case, there cannot be a single act type, j-ing, such 
that [4 is even] is the act type of j-ing [4], [even] and [2+2 is even] is the act type of j-ing 
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[2+2], [even]. Here is a different way of making the same point: on Russellian theories, [4] = 4, 
and thus, f([is even], [4]) is a proposition about the number 4. But then, f([is even], [2+2]) must 
also be a proposition about the complex [2+2], to the effect that it is even, and would therefore 
be untrue, since only numbers are even. Hence the need for two separate act types, direct and 
mediate predication. 
By comparison, a Fregean theory will take both simple singular terms (names) and 
complex ones to express the same kind of entity, namely, an individual concept. ‘2+2’ is most 
naturally taken to express the complex concept C(PLUS, TWO, TWO), where PLUS is a dyadic 
“functor” concept, i.e., one that can be conjoined with two individual concepts to form a new 
individual concept. This theory can therefore without further ado take [2+2 is even] and [4 is 
even] to be the same kind of act type on constituents, and can thus take them to differ only in 
having different constituents, expressed by the relevant singular terms.  
 The main problem for Soames’ theory I want to discuss consists in the complications 
required for dealing with such “mixed” propositions as [2+2 is greater than 3], i.e., propositions 
expressed by sentences containing both simple and complex singular terms. This proposition 
cannot be the act type of directly predicating [greater than] of [2+2] and [3], for this would be 
a proposition representing the complex [2+2] as greater than 3, which would make it false, since 
[2+2] is not a number. Nor can [2+2 is greater than 3] be the act type of mediately predicating 
[greater than] of [2+2] and [3], for mediate predication is defined only for complexes like [2+2]. 
The obvious upshot seems to be that Soames is forced to posit a more complex account 
of predication in order to deal with relational propositions. It may be thought that he could say 
that [2+2 is greater than 3] is:  
 
the act type of predicating [greater than] mediately of [2+2] yet directly of 3.  
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But this is most naturally interpreted as entailing the false claim that [greater than] is a property, 
rather than a two-place relation, which is predicated in one way of [2+2] and in a different way 
of the number 3. Since this interpretation is unwanted, we would like rather to refer to the 
relevant act type unambiguously as an act type of predicating a relation of two objects, but 
where the objects are nevertheless somehow acted upon in different ways.  
It is not clear what notation to use in order to achieve this, but one possibility is to say 
that [2+2 is greater than 3] is the act type of predicating [greater than] mediately1 and directly2 
of [2+2] and 3, where the subscripts indicate which object is acted upon in what way. Clearly, 
a host of new kinds of act type is now needed, for we will also need a new act type to cover 
[3 is greater than 2+2] (note the reverse order), and still more kinds of act to cover propositions 
involving relations with more than 2 argument-places. Since there are multigrade relations 
among numbers, like being the average of, which can relate any number of objects, we will 
need to posit infinitely many distinct types of predication.  
This account might be a coherent option, but it is still somewhat obscure. The notion of 
predicating in a certain way, relative to a given argument place, is not one that is easily 
anchored in any intuitive examples. The account is also unattractively complex, especially since 
it merely serves to identify different logically atomic propositions. These atomic propositions 
are those expressed by sentences of the same basic form, namely, ‘F(t1, …, tn)’ (where the terms 
may be either simple or formed by applying a functor to one or more terms). Propositions of 
this basic form should come out as more uniform. On the Fregean account, [2+2 is greater 
than 3] is simply C(GREATER THAN, C(PLUS, TWO, TWO), THREE), and analogously for all other 
propositions expressed by a sentence of the form, ‘F(t1, …, tn)’. 
 It may be thought that Soames could give a simpler account by speaking of a more 
inclusive act type of predicating*, such that, by definition, one predicates* x of y if and only if 
one either directly predicates x of y or mediately predicates x of y. Could we not say, then, that 
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[2+2 is greater than 3] is the act of predicating* [greater than] of [2+2] and 3? No, for this would 
be an act type that can be performed by directly predicating [greater than] of [2+2] and 3, but 
the latter act type, of course, is the proposition [[2+2] is greater than 3], which is anomalous in 
that it represents a non-number as greater than 3. This act type of predicating* would also be 
performed by mediately predicating [greater than] of [2+2] and 3, but mediate predication is 
only defined for complexes like [2+2]. 
 Similar remarks apply to predicating**, which, by definition, one performs iff one either 
directly or indirectly predicates something of something else. If we now try saying that [2+2 is 
greater than 3] is the act type of predicating** [greater than] of 2+2 and 3, it follows that this 
act can be performed by directly predicating [greater than] of 2+2 and 3. But this means that 
this proposition can be performed without mediately predicating anything of [2+2], contrary to 
Soames’ intentions. Thus, appealing to more inclusive act types cannot help simplify the 
Russellian account of mixed propositions like [2+2 is greater than 3]. 
 Another possibility might be to appeal to act types defined inductively, as in: 
 
A predicates*** x of y iff (either: y is an ordinary object (that is, not a “complex”) and A 
directly predicates x of y, or: y is a complex and A mediately predicates x of y). 
 
But this does not cover cases in which relations are predicated of several objects. And if we 
replace ‘y’ with ‘y1, …, yn’ so as to cover these cases, we end up with an account unable to deal 
with mixed propositions. Somehow, the manner of predication must be different for different 
types predication targets, as in proposal with subscripts above.  
Another problem with the definition above is that it entails that no act of predication*** 
can be a proposition that is about a complex like [2+2]. For whenever the predication target is 
a complex of this kind, the act or predication*** is always an act of mediate predication. But 
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of course it should be possible—even if it is unusual—to directly predicate properties of these 
complexes, e.g., when theorizing about propositions. This is a distinct problem arising 
specifically for act types that are inductively defined in the manner above. 
 Here is a different account of mixed propositions that may seem like the best option for 
Russellian act-type theorists: we characterize a mixed proposition by first identifying a complex 
property or relation involving all of the direct predication targets, and then identify the 
proposition with the act of mediately predicating this property or relation of the remaining 
complex(es). Then, [2+2 is greater than 3] is the act of mediately predicating the property of 
being greater than 3 of [2+2], and [3+3 is the average of 2, 4, and 7–1] is the act of mediately 
predicating the relation lxy[x is the average of 2, 4, and y] of [3+3] and [7–1], and so on. The 
problem with this option is that it allows complex properties to be constituents of propositions, 
which engenders an implausible “proliferation of propositions”. This proliferation is the topic 
of the next section. 
 In his (2014), Soames offers an account that may at first seem to be precisely the one I 
just sketched. He writes 
 
When an n-place predicate is paired with n arguments—some of which may be Millian and some 
non-Millian—we must think of the predication as proceeding in stages. This technique, familiar 
from Montague, treats the proposition expressed by a sentence of the form  
 
(17) A loves B  
 
as arising first by combining the two-place relation loves with the content/referent of the term 
replacing “B,” and then predicating the resulting one-place property of the content/referent of the 
term “A.” When “B” is replaced by a Millian singular term the content and referent of which is x, 
the resulting one-place property is loving x, which may then be predicated directly, or indirectly, of 
the referent or content of the term that replaces “A,” depending on whether that term is Millian or 
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non-Millian. When “B” is replaced by a non-Millian singular term—e.g. something the content of 
which is a complex consisting [of] fthe combined with an argument g—the resulting one-place 
property is loving whomever is the value of fthe at g—which may, of course, also be predicated 
directly, or indirectly, of the referent or content of the term that replaces “A.” Thus the operation, 
call it “reduction,” that maps an n-place relation plus an argument to the relevant n-1 place relation 
subdivides into direct and indirect reduction, on analogy with direct and indirect predication. (2014: 
123–124) 
  
A problem with this passage is that no account is given of the property Soames refers to as, 
‘loving whomever is the value of fthe at g’. If the definite description, ‘the value of fthe at g’, is 
understood along Russellian lines, then the kind of “complex” that Soames in other texts takes 
to be expressed by complex singular terms (which are non-Millian) will play no role in the 
proposition expressed by the sentence at all. Thus, the “reduction” proposed would then play 
no role accounting for which propositions are expressed by sentences containing ‘2+2’. (Below, 
I note that Soames is rather unclear about definite descriptions, but what is clear is that he does 
not treat such terms as ‘2+2’ as Russellian descriptions.)  
It seems, then, that the property designator, ‘loving whomever is the value of fthe at g’ 
must rather be interpreted somehow in accordance with Soames’ idea about “complexes”, so 
that ‘the value of fthe at g’ refers now to such a complex. But while Soames gives an account of 
how act types involving such complexes are to be understood, it is not clear how properties (or 
relations) are supposed to involve them. Clearly, the property referred to by the designator in 
question cannot be the property of loving the complex, if such there be, expressed by ‘the value 
of fthe at g’. To concretize, the property referred to by ‘loves the President of the U.S.’ cannot 
be the property of loving x, where x is the complex expressed by ‘the President of the U.S.’. It 
would be very odd to love such an entity. So the proposition expressed by ‘John loves the 
President of the U.S.’ cannot be the act type of predicating that property of John. The account 
of mixed propositions that I sketched is therefore preferable to Soames’ account quoted above. 
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Let me now consider how Hanks’ theory fares with respect to complex singular terms. I 
will try to show that although his theory at first may seem to have the means of dealing with 
these cases, it turns out to be committed to the same kind of complications as Soames’ account. 
Because of the Russellian aspect of his theory, he is forced to postulate a further type of 
predication, whose targets will include complex entities that are expressed by complex singular 
terms. The other, Fregean aspect of his theory may at first seem to offer a viable account of 
mixed propositions. To wit, it may be thought that he could distinguish the propositions [2+2 
is even] and [4 is even] by taking them to involve distinct acts of referring to the number 4: a 
“direct” act of reference and an “indirect” one, which could be characterized as an act of 
referring to the number 4 as the sum of 2 and 2, or some such.  
The reason this will not suffice is that it leaves unanswered the question of what 
predication target is involved in the proposition [2+2 is even]. It cannot be the referent of the 
complex singular term ‘2+2’, for a speaker could entertain (or judge) the proposition expressed 
by a sentence of the form ‘f(m, n) is F’ without the referent of ‘f(m, n)’ occurring to her at all, 
in which case she would not be predicating anything of that object. For instance, one might 
wrongly believe that m + n = i, whereas, in fact, m + n = j, and thus entertain or judge the 
proposition that m + n = i without the number j coming to one’s mind at all, although it is the 
referent of ‘m + n’. Or one might wrongly believe that a certain expression, like ‘3/0’, has a 
referent although it has none (division being undefined for 0 as divisor). There is still a 
proposition expressed by ‘3/0 is odd’, which one might believe, judge, etc., but it cannot involve 
an act of predicating anything of the referent of the term.  
Thus, even though Hanks’ theory contains a complication intended to handle cases of co-
referring non-synonymous singular terms, this complication will not help with cases in which 
one of them is complex (as opposed to the case of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’). (All of this 
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of course assumes that Hanks does not simply treat these singular terms as Russell descriptions, 
in which case the problem does not arise.) 
One could now complain that Hanks offers a theory which gives different accounts of 
different instances of the same general problem. The general problem is that of non-
synonymous co-referring singular terms, and the theory offers one account of instances 
involving two simple singular terms, and a different account of cases in which one of the 
singular terms is complex. That is, the difference between [Hesperus is hot] and [Phosphorus 
is hot] is explained by reference to distinct acts of referring, while the difference between [2+2 
is even] and [4 is even] is explained by recourse to distinct types of predicating. The purely 
Fregean theory, by contrast, deals with both cases in the same way, by associating different 
individual concepts to non-synonymous singular terms, whatever their complexity. 
For completeness, we should also mention a further, obvious alternative way in which 
Hanks and Soames might deal with complex singular terms, namely, of taking them to be 
Russellian descriptions, i.e., a kind of complex quantificational expression. If they do, then the 
problem of mixed propositions would not arise at all, since the problem essentially involves 
Soames’ “complexes” that are the supposed contents such singular terms as ‘2+2’. 
If Soames were to accept this kind of approach, then he would identify [2+2 is even] with 
an act type of predicating a certain complex higher-order property of the property of being even, 
rather than an act type of predicating evenness of something. The term ‘2+2’ would then be 
treated as synonymous with the description ‘ix(Sum(x, 2, 2))’, where ‘Sum’ is a primitive, 
triadic predicate (it must be primitive, since it cannot be defined as ‘… is the sum of …’, as that 
definiens contains a definite description). Since we have seen that the problem with complex 
singular terms affects any Russellian theory of propositions, and not merely act-type theories, 
Russell’s theory of descriptions would in fact come to the rescue of his own theory of 
propositions. I don’t know whether this is incidental, or something Russell himself realized. 
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Soames does not accept this view of terms like ‘2+2’, but it is unclear what he thinks of 
definite descriptions. On the one hand, he says that “[t]he proposition that the G is H is the act 
of taking g as argument of ι, and mediately predicating being H of the complex ι-plus-g” (2015: 
37). Clearly, he is here adopting the same kind of account of definite descriptions as of ‘2+2’ 
and the like. But in a footnote on the same page, he says, “I lean toward Russell in taking 
singular definite descriptions in English to be generalized quantifiers, I lean toward Frege in 
recognizing the legitimacy of complex singular terms conforming to his analysis”. It is hard to 
reconcile his claim about the proposition that the G is H with the claim that “singular definite 
descriptions in English are generalized quantifiers”. 
Let me close this section by repeating its most important general lesson: given a Fregean 
treatment of complex singular terms like ‘2+2’, mixed propositions present a problem for 
Russellian act-type theories like that of Soames. Several attempts to solve this problem turned 
out to be untenable or unattractive. The most promising solution consists in identifying complex 
properties expressed by complex predicates containing proper names, and then taking the 
sentence as a whole to express act types of mediately predicating such properties of 
“complexes” expressed by complex singular terms. Quite incidentally, however, taking 
complex properties to be constituents of propositions in this way, while also accepting an act-
type theory of propositions, engenders an unappealing proliferation of propositions, to which 
we now turn. 
 
 
2. The problem of proliferating propositions 
Jeffrey King (2013: 131f.) argues that act-type theories are committed to an unacceptable 
“proliferation of propositions”, which arises as we consider propositions with a polyadic 
predicative constituent, e.g., [Mary loves John]. This proposition can be identified both with 
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the act type of predicating love of Mary and John (in that order), but also with the act type of 
predicating the property of loving John of Mary, or again the act type of predicating the property 
of being loved by Mary of John. But these acts are all distinct, as they are acts on distinct objects 
(see also Jespersen (2015, forthcoming), and Båve (2019a) for discussion). 
 King finds the proliferation of propositions immediately objectionable. Accordingly, he 
does not provide any reason why this proliferation should not be tolerated. In Båve (2019a), 
however, I pointed to some “awkward questions” arising for theorists committed to such 
proliferation: 
 
which of the 31 propositions expressed by ‘6 + 2 = 4 + 3 + 1’ does one believe when, 
as we would naïvely put it, one “believes that 6 + 2 = 4 + 3 + 1? All of them? Could 
one believe one but not the others? If one can, then how do the beliefs differ? (Båve 
(2019a: 195f.)) 
 
(The “31 propositions” mentioned here are derived from my claim that “a sentence with n 
names has ∑ 2#$%& n−i analyses” (Båve (2019a: 185)), each of which will be correlated with a 
distinct act type.) I also discussed some possible answers to this question and found problems 
with each. 
 The problem of proliferating propositions is not the same as my own argument against 
act-type theories, which rather aims to show that the latter entail massive ambiguity in sentences 
with alternative analyses. That argument, however, could be neutralized, e.g., by denying that 
there are sentences with alternative analyses. But the proliferation problem would still remain.  
 The proliferation of propositions is not a problem that affects any Russellian theory. It 
affects act-type theories, because acts on different entities are distinct. More generally, act types 
satisfy the schema (G), 
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(G) If X(x1, . . ., xn) = X(y1, . . ., yn), then each of x1, . . ., xn is identical with one of y1, . 
. ., yn (Båve (2019a: 202)), 
 
where x1, . . ., xn are immediate constituents of logically atomic propositions and ‘X’ stands 
proxy for some expression describing the way the constituents are combined to form 
propositions, e.g., ‘the act type of predicating … of …’. Not all replacements of ‘X’ satisfy (G), 
however, e.g., ‘the mereological sum of …’, which means that some Russellian theories may 
avoid the problem of proliferation. 
An obvious way of avoiding the proliferation of propositions is simply to reject the 
existence of complex predicative propositional constituents, like [loves John] or [Mary loves]. 
This way out seems available to Fregeans, since there is no obvious reason why they must 
postulate complex predicative concepts. For the Russellian, however, the problem is more 
difficult, since, for them, these constituents are simply complex properties, like the property of 
being loved by Mary, which it seems implausible to simply reject (more on why below). We 
have also seen that if they opt for this response, their best (and perhaps only viable) solution to 
the problem of mixed propositions is no longer available. 
 One may object that Fregeans are not in fact in a better situation than Russellians, simply 
because complex predicative constituents of propositions are indispensable. One reason for 
thinking so is that certain generalizations over propositions that we want to state would not have 
their intended logical strength unless we postulate complex predicative constituents (Båve 
(2019a: 186f.)). For instance, the general claim that substitution of identicals is truth-
preserving, considered as a claim about structured propositions, rather than sentences, requires 
precisely complex predicative constituents. The claim in question is, 
 
(PI)  For every x, y, P, if f2([=], x, y) and f(P, x) are true, then f(P, y) is true. 
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Here, ‘x’ and ‘y’ range over the kind of propositional constituents that are expressed by names 
(objects, for Russellians and “individual concepts”, for Fregeans), and ‘P’ ranges over 
predicative constituents. Further, f takes the semantic correlates of a monadic predicate and a 
name to a proposition composed by the two, and f2 takes the semantic correlates of a dyadic 
predicate and two names to a proposition composed of them (Båve (2019b: 187)). The reason 
we must quantify over complex predicative constituents is now simply that (PI) above would 
not entail the instance saying that if [John = James] and [Mary loves John] are true, so is [Mary 
loves James], unless ‘P’ is taken to range over both simple and complex predicative 
constituents.  
One might imagine someone hypothesizing that such instances could instead be 
generalized over using quantification into bracket-position. But such quantification does not 
have the effect of quantifying over propositional constituents, and is, quite generally, very 
problematic (see Båve (2017) and Pautz (2008)). In any case, it is reasonable that an adherent 
of structured propositions would also want to generalize over propositional constituents in the 
way we do in (PI).  
There is a fairly simple response to this argument, however: even if generalizing over the 
relevant instances using (PI) would require quantifying over complex predicative constituents, 
other generalizations than (PI) could be used to cover the same instances, but without the need 
for complex predicative constituents. To wit, we can operate with a notion of “substitution” 
within propositions, and replace (PI) by, 
 
(PI2) For every x, y, p, if f2([=], x, y) and p are true, then Sub(p, x, y) is true, 
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where Sub(p, x, y) is the proposition which is exactly like p except that in every place in which 
x occurs in p, y occurs in Sub(p, x, y). This of course requires that we can make sense of “places” 
in propositions. But on a structured conception of propositions, this is rather straightforward. 
To wit, we can individuate places by reference to ordered constituents of propositions. We thus 
merely need to add the further, innocuous assumption that propositions are structured as trees 
with ordered branches. This can easily be accommodated on the theories targeted by the 
argument from alternative analyses.  
Taking Soames’s theory as example, we could say that the act type of predicating wisdom 
of Socrates has wisdom and Socrates as its first and second immediate constituents, 
respectively. Act-type theorists could further identify logically complex propositions with acts 
on propositions (Soames (2015: 31)). We could then, following Polish notation, identify [p or 
q] with the act of “disjoining” [p] and [q] and say that the first constituent is the act of disjoining, 
the second is [p], and the third is [q], and so on. The ordering is arbitrary, but once the arbitrary 
decision has been made, we can go on to refer to places in propositions in a disciplined way. 
Now, we could thus state a Fregean abstraction principle for places in propositions as 
follows: 
 
(PLACE) the place of x in y = the place of z in w iff: x is the n1th immediate constituent 
of … the nkth immediate constituent of y iff z is the n1th immediate constituent 
of … the nkth immediate constituent of w. 
 
We can now deduce such identity claims as, ‘the place of [loves] in [John loves Mary and 
Kripke is a philosopher] = the place of [detests] in [Brutus detests Caesar and Cicero is an 
orator], and so on. More restrictive constraints on place identity could easily be added to 
(PLACE) if needed, e.g., that y and w have the same number of constituents, that their 
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constituents have the same number of constituents, that the places of a and b are identical only 
if a and b are expressed by expressions of the same syntactic category, and so on. Such details 
do not matter for the general intelligibility of speaking of places in propositions. 
Of course, Russellians could equally speak of substitution within propositions, but this is 
neither here nor there. For the original argument against Russellian act-type theories was that 
it is implausible on independent grounds for them to reject complex predicative constituents. 
The fact that a given argument for the need to postulate such constituents can be answered by 
Fregeans does not, of course, help Russellians with that problem. 
 Let us consider a different kind of response on behalf of the Russellian. They could 
conceivably say that although complex properties exist, there is no proposition containing them 
in the way propositions can contain simple properties. Thus, while there is such a proposition 
as the act type of predicating wisdom of Socrates, there is no such act type as the act of 
predicating the property of loving John of Mary. Basically, the idea is that complex properties 
cannot be predicated (of anything). This seems wildly ad hoc, however. Why can complex 
properties not be predicated of things, if simple properties can? (This response of course also 
precludes Russellians from their most plausible account of mixed propositions.) Disallowing 
complex properties as constituents of propositions also seems to preclude Soames’ favoured 
account of quantification, on which ‘Someone loves John’ expresses the act type of predicating 
a higher-order property of the property of loving John. He could perhaps say that complex 
properties cannot be predicated of anything, although properties can be predicated of them. But 
this, too, seems ad hoc. 
 A further problem for this response arises as we consider primitive predicates expressing 
complex predicates. It seems clear that Russellian act-type theorists must take an atomic 
sentence containing such a predicate to express an act type of predicating the complex property 
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of the object(s) referred to by the name(s) in the sentence. But then, they have to allow complex 
predicates to be predicated of objects after all. 
 Here, it may be objected that the same problem surely affects Fregean theories; that is, 
Fregeans are just as committed to allowing complex predicative constituents as Russellians, 
and thus the above reason for thinking that Fregeans are better equipped to deal with 
proliferating propositions fails. I will argue, however, that there is an independent reason why 
Fregeans should deny the possibility of simple predicates expressing complex predicative 
concepts. Hence, that denial is not ad hoc.  
Consider ‘brother’, which may seem like a good candidate for a simple predicate 
expressing a complex predicative concept (namely, the concept MALE SIBLING). This is what 
Fregeans have independent reason for denying. The reason is that it seems clear that someone 
could doubt that all brothers are male siblings without doubting that all brothers are brothers. 
They might come to doubt the former, for instance, under the influence of criticisms of the 
“Classical theory of concepts”. Also, it does not matter for the argument whether it would be 
rational to doubt this or not. It then follows, by ordinary cognitive significance criteria of 
concept identity, the concept BROTHER ≠ MALE SIBLING.  
Quite generally, it seems that whenever a simple predicate is defined as true of an object 
iff a given complex predicate is, someone could come to doubt what is expressed by that 
definition. The relation between the two concepts will then have to be some relation of analytic 
equivalence that falls short of identity. They could, for instance, say that the two concepts are 
such that in order to possess the one, one must be disposed to infer between propositions 
involving it and propositions involving the other (in the same place). In sum, then, Fregeans 
have independent reason to deny that a simple predicate can ever express a complex concept, 
and, hence, they can stick with the original response, rejecting such complex predicates that 
give rise to proliferating propositions.  
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Note, though, that MALE SIBLING is not such a concept, and thus, it can be accepted by 
Fregeans. The kind of complex predicate that must be rejected is rather the kind formed by a n-
place predicative concept and an individual concept to form a n–1-place predicative concept. 
For instance, assuming that ‘pray’ is defined as ‘speak to God’, Fregeans must reject the claim 
that ‘pray’ expresses the complex concept SPEAK-TO GOD, and say rather that it expresses the 
simple concept PRAY, which, however, may be analytically equivalent to SPEAK-TO GOD. Thus, 
while ‘John prays’ expresses C[PRAY, JOHN], ‘John speaks to God’ expresses C[SPEAKS-TO, 
JOHN, GOD]. The two are analytically equivalent but distinct. Since we do not posit any such 
complex predicative concepts as SPEAKS-TO GOD or JOHN SPEAKS-TO, there is no proliferation 
of propositions. 
For Russellians to attempt an analogous response would be to postulate properties with 
extremely fine grain, such that the property of praying is distinct from the property of speaking 
to God, even when ‘pray’ is definitionally equivalent to ‘speak to God’. This would be in 
contradiction with Russellians’ standard strategy of accounting for differences in cognitive 
significance by positing differences between ways of conceiving propositions, or between ways 
in which propositions are presented, rather than by distinguishing between propositions. This 
kind of Russellianism would thus really be Fregean—in spirit, if not in letter—with respect to 
predicative propositional constituents. The fine grained predicative constituents would be 
called ‘properties’, but would really function as Fregean senses, or what I am calling concepts. 
Let us therefore return to the response on behalf of Russellians that we first entertained, 
of simply rejecting complex properties. We have already seen two reasons against doing so; 
that complex properties are required by the best solution to the problem of complex singular 
terms, and that they are needed as the semantic values of some primitive predicates. Other 
reasons are familiar from many long-standing debates in Metaphysics. Since expressions like 
‘the property of being loved by Mary’ are well-formed expressions of ordinary English, 
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rejecting complex properties would lead to a host of problems akin to those facing nominalists 
about properties in general. Should they say that all sentences containing such property 
designators are untrue—thus imputing massive error—or should they try to somehow analyze 
them as not really containing singular terms purporting to refer to properties? Both options are 
uninviting. 
Secondly, quantifying over complex properties affords a useful kind of expressive power. 
Consider the sentence,  
 
(N) Napoleon has all the properties of a great general.  
 
This sentence illustrates the relevant expressive power in that (N) entails such sentences as, ‘If 
a great general loves his army, then Napoleon loves his army’. But if we reject complex 
properties, then we cannot use (N) to cover this instance, since that would require ontological 
commitment to the property of loving one’s army, which is complex.  
It may be thought that this is not a problem, since predicative quantification, i.e., 
quantification into predicate position, would do this job equally well. But even if (N) could be 
paraphrased into a predicatively quantified sentence, there will be more complicated cases than 
these simple quantificational ones, for which it will be difficult to find paraphrases involving 
predicative quantifiers, e.g., “a has twice as many properties of kind X as b” (cf. Båve (2015: 
§4)).  
Fregeans seem to be in a better position. The two reasons above for accepting complex 
properties do not clearly translate into reasons for accepting complex predicative concepts. 
Perhaps the expression ‘the concept of loving John’ is well-formed, but rejecting the existence 
of the concept of loving John still seems less contentious than rejecting the corresponding 
property. The notion of a concept, as used in a theory of structured propositions, is plausibly 
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technical and need not necessarily be taken as the referents of these natural-language concept 
designators. Further, the expressive power of property talk can of course be enjoyed by 
Fregeans without further ado, since they have no reason to reject complex properties.  
As against this, Fregeans and Russellians admittedly seem to be in perfectly symmetric 
positions with respect to expressive power. For couldn’t Russellians simply reject complex 
properties and then quantify over complex concepts in order to attain the desired expressive 
power? That would mean, for instance, replacing (N) with something like, ‘Napoleon falls 
under every concept under which a great general falls’? Perhaps, but I doubt Russellians like 
Soames would be willing to reject complex properties in favour of complex predicative 
concepts in this way.  
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